— Inspectors with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission have uncovered several issues related to Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant’s maintenance programs, but nothing that would cause significant safety issues for the plant or the public.

The NRC’s findings were made public during a Thursday meeting at the plant. The results represented an end to the second phase of the intensive 95003 inspections required following a “red” finding issued last year following the failure of a low pressure coolant injection valve.

The valve is part of a system that would be used for core cooling during certain accident scenarios and its inoperable state could have led to core damage had a series of unlikely events occurred. The valve has since been repaired.

Phase 1 of the inspections concluded in September. Phase 3, regarded as the most stringent, will begin within 120 days of plant managers informing the NRC they are ready for the inspections to begin.

“I’d want to know as a member of the public what these inspections are doing,” said Len Wert, deputy regional administrator for NRC operations. “Not only are we looking at the symptoms, but we’re peeling the onion beyond the first layer.”

Lead inspector John Jandovitz described the second phase as “unusual” because it dealt with in-process maintenance observations and following technicians in the field. Inspectors were tasked to identify and evaluate past equipment and maintenance issues, which included looking at repetitive tasks or components that had to be fixed multiple times. Field observations focused on employees who perform maintenance work and others who support maintenance workers.

Inspectors also reviewed the overall adequacy of the maintenance program and evaluated programmatic support of station equipment reliability.

“We wanted to look at corrective maintenance programs and how well the site is implementing long-term maintenance,” Jandovitz said. “We wanted to look at those plans and see how they were being integrated into long-term plans.”

Inspectors also checked to see if systems are capable of performing safety functions and assessed the safety culture aspects associated with maintenance activities. Safety culture observations were also part of Phase 1 inspections and will be a large part of Phase 3.

Jandovitz said at least one NRC issue or violation was uncovered, related to battery chargers that are not only used to charge batteries but also provide DC power to the plant. Capacitors in the battery charges can fail, depending on age, and should be replaced every 10 to 15 years.

“About half the capacitors had never been replaced, which could affect reliability,” Jandovitz said, adding that batteries and chargers still worked. “Half of them had not been replaced since the mid-1970s. … Browns Ferry has committed to an expedited replacement schedule and better … testing criteria.”

Jandovitz describe the finding as “low safety significance” and would be documented as a “green” finding.

Inspectors also observed other behaviors that will be explored more closely in Phase 3 inspections, including:

• Room for improvement in the plant’s Corrective Action Programs, or CAP;

• Repeat issues related to planning for maintenance tests;

• TVA inspectors failing to write CAP reports on their peers;

• Standards and inspections that were “weak in some areas,” including maintenance jobs being reported as “in progress” but no timelines for completion of the work;

• Issues with the plant’s Performance Indicators that are not regulatory programs prescribed by the NRC but used to improve equipment and reliability. Jandovitz said “mixed messages” had been sent and inspectors were under the impression the indicators were not being used to serve their purpose.”

Inspectors also identified issues with the plant’s Equipment Failure Trending report, which had not been updated since 2009. Jandovitz said the report tracks and trends critical component failures.

Another issue was found with the plant’s Rework Reduction Program, the purpose of which is to ensure maintenance actions are accomplished correctly the first time. Jandovitz said at least 25 to 30 reworked components were identified, but did not match the rework coordinator’s list. A new rework coordinator took over the program and the report began to degrade further.

“Procedures were in place with rework, trending and tracking, but people just weren’t doing them,” he said. “The programs that support equipment and reliability were not being managed correctly.”

Browns Ferry’s post-maintenance tests were also scrutinized because they were not being performed. Jandovitz said if the tests aren’t being done, there’s no way to know if work was performed correctly.

Inspectors identified two safety issues, including rubber hose, considered combustible, found in a fire exclusion area. Jandovitz said even though the hose had just been placed there that day, someone should have noticed it was a hazard. Duct tape was also found covering a drain, but employees did not know how long it had been there or the significance of the tape.

In summary, Jandovitz said equipment reliability objectives were being affected because of communication, performance indicators, planning and a significant repetition of rework.

Browns Ferry site manager Keith Polson said plant officials agreed with the NRC violation of “low safety significance” and added that management appreciated the inspectors’ insights.

“Our goal is not only to be regulatory compliant, but to strive for excellence in all areas,” he said. “We have action plans in place called Gaps of Excellence that will be rolled up into an improvement plan. We get it and we agree with what was said. Our goal is to be the best nuclear plant in the country.”